Cultural Dynamics of Civic Action in the Central Highlands of Vietnam, 1967–1968

FARIS R. KIRKLAND*

History offers many examples of military intervention in foreign cultures for comparatively benign, if ultimately manipulative, purposes. These purposes have included religious enlightenment, economic development, and pacification. All of them have required military personnel to operate in unfamiliar cultural settings, and the success of the intervention was often a function of the readiness of the foreigners to learn about the indigenous culture and their trustworthiness. During the war in Vietnam the U.S. armed forces undertook a broad range of political, economic, and social programs as well as combat operations.[1] Many of these, in particular the work of the Marine Corps Combined Action Platoons, have been described in detail.[2] One that has not been documented, and that illustrates the essentiality of intercultural knowledge on the part of the intervening power, is the civic action program conducted by the U.S. Army 4th Infantry Division in Pleiku Province in 1967 and 1968. Pleiku is a largely rural area on the western frontier of the Central Highlands. The events that took place there constitute a case study of the complexities that arise when a government seeks to manipulate the attitudes of members of a foreign population.

* *Editor's Note:* Dr. Faris R. Kirkland, an esteemed colleague and Associate Editor of *Armed Forces & Society*, died while this article was in press. Dr. Kirkland was one of the nation's leading historians of U.S. Army leadership doctrine and practice. He is also widely known and respected for his work as a social historian while in the Department of Military Psychiatry of the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research. Dr. Kirkland was an artillery officer (Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army, Retired), who served his country in the wars in Korea and Vietnam, and later taught at the University of Pennsylvania and at Bryn Mawr College. We will greatly miss his many and valuable contributions to this journal, to our field, and to the international community of scholars. *Address for correspondence:* Mrs. Faris R. Kirkland, 121 Kennedy Lane, Bryn Mawr, PA 19010.

ARMED FORCES & SOCIETY, Vol. 26, No. 4, Summer 2000, pp. 547–560.

Three Cultures

My focus is on the interactions among three of the cultures in the Central Highlands: ethnic Vietnamese officials of the government of the Republic of (South) Vietnam (GVN), Montagnard tribespeople who made up the bulk of the population of the Highlands, and the civic action teams of the U.S. 4th Infantry Division. Three other cultures influenced their interactions: the legacy of the French occupation, the Peoples' Liberation Army of (North) Vietnam (NVA), and their South Vietnamese auxiliaries, the National Liberation Front or Viet Cong (VC).

The South Vietnamese government was an integrated military-civilian hierarchy. The chief of state and the chief executive of each of the four political-geographical subdivisions (called corps) were army major generals. Most of the 44 provinces were headed by army lieutenant colonels. Each province had three to six districts, each headed by an army captain or major. Within a district were 5 to 50 villages and hamlets. Corps, province, and district chiefs had military-civilian staffs who ran the war and managed the entire range of governmental activities, including agriculture, commerce, police, education, public health, sanitation, civil engineering, finance, housing, propaganda, and minority affairs.

The culture of Vietnamese officialdom had its roots in the mandarin tradition of classical education and unquestioned authority, and the French colonial tradition of paternalism, intimidation, and ceremony.[3] But Vietnamese officials were neither mandarins nor French. Former noncommissioned officers or civilian functionaries under a colonial regime, they faced problems for which they were unprepared by education, experience, or family tradition. Their authority depended on their influence with the senior officials in Saigon, the patronage and resources (from the U.S.) that they could dispense, and the soldiers or militiamen at their disposal.[4] Serving a government that had no solid foundation for its legitimacy, and was in reality an artifact of U.S. policy, they were understandably insecure.

The Montagnards were the descendants of ancient civilizations whose people had been driven away from the fertile coastal plains and into the mountains by successive waves of migration from northern Vietnam.[5] Scholars have identified about 30 major ethnic groups of Montagnards linguistically distinct from each other and from the Vietnamese.[6] The Montagnards in the Pleiku area belonged to the Jarai, Rhadé, or Bahnar tribes. Montagnard languages were not written, but missionaries were transcribing some of them.[7] Few Montagnards spoke Vietnamese, and almost none could read or write it.[8]

Montagnard customs vary, but most tribes in Pleiku Province had a near-Neolithic style of living. They fished, cultivated rice and some other crops, and kept a few pigs and chickens running loose in the villages. They made their tools, clothes, houses, cooking utensils, and household artifacts from natural materials. Tribes in the Pleiku area had one item from modern technology—a short steel knife with a long bamboo handle. The Montagnard's knife was almost a part of his body; he used it to eat, build houses, harvest, and for a variety of other purposes.[9] Montagnards had no electricity, radios, nails, written materials, medicine, running water, or motor vehicles.

Though officially Vietnamese policy was to promote Montagnard cultural and economic development, the operative policy and the behavior of officials and private citizens was to keep them ignorant and isolated in remote areas with no part in the mainstream culture of Vietnam.[10] Vietnamese attitudes toward Montagnards were similar to the fear and contempt with which European settlers and Caucasian Americans regarded the indigenous peoples of the Americas.

The U.S. Army in 1967 had evolved into an authoritarian and anti-intellectual culture. It focused on appearances rather than substance and was ill-prepared to engage in adaptive or creative behavior.[11] For an authoritarian army, the war in Vietnam was uncongenial. It was a war in which the Americans' claim to righteousness was threadbare. Their opponent was a nationalist movement that had repeatedly sought U.S. support, and been rebuffed in favor of French colonial interests.[12] Many Americans disliked their South Vietnamese allies. Inadequately trained, underpaid, and fearful for their futures, many Vietnamese officers shunned combat, lied as a matter of course, and used their positions to augment their own incomes.[13] The war in Vietnam resembled no U.S. wars in recent memory, and it required of its leaders a willingness to learn about foreign cultural systems and a readiness to try new approaches.

American Military Civic Action Teams

Civic action was one of the spheres in which new approaches were essential. Because the Vietnamese government was largely an American creation, winning the loyalty of the citizenry for the regime was a cornerstone of U.S. policy. Senior U.S. commanders required their subordinate units to organize civic action teams to demonstrate the concern that the Vietnamese government and its U.S. ally had for the welfare of civilians living in their zones of responsibility. In the 4th Infantry Division, civic action was called the Good Neighbor Program.[14]

Maj. Gen. William F. Peers,[15] who commanded the 4th Infantry Division in 1967, saw winning the confidence and friendship of the people living in the area where his men were operating as a way of assuring the security of his forces and denying enemy guerrillas concealment and support. He directed each of his 21 assigned and attached battalions and two separate companies to field a 10-man civic action team to work full-time with three or four Montagnard hamlets. The teams were to provide basic medical care and assist with small-scale public works.[16]

Commanders did not welcome the civic action mission. No additional personnel or equipment were authorized; they had to come from units that were already under strength. No one had any experience with civic action. While commanders were exasperated by the additional mission, the soldiers had a different perspective. Though civic action was probably more dangerous than combat operations, most soldiers who worked on the teams became intensely attached to the mission. Team leaders were usually Regular Army sergeants, or new second lieutenants. Often outstanding soldiers sought duty on civic action teams.[17] The teams enjoyed great autonomy; inspectors were loath to venture into the isolated and insecure Montagnard hamlets. The work was constructive and rewarding, and the Montagnards were friendly and open. Some of the older Montagnard men had served in the French Army and had positive feelings toward westerners.[18]

The interface between the emerging civic action subculture and the Army command structure was the division G-5.[19] Other officers had no knowledge of civic action, and little interest in it. The Army wanted a quick payoff for its investment in the civic action program, and an unofficial policy emerged: "We'll treat your sick children if you will tell us where the Viet Cong are." The Montagnards were not stupid; they kept the Americans happy with plausible stories that could neither be confirmed nor disconfirmed. In late 1967 personnel changes on the G-5 staff permitted adoption of a new policy that eliminated the quid pro quo—the Americans would no longer demand information about the enemy in return for assistance they gave the Montagnards. The civic action teams simply worked to support the Montagnards' efforts to help themselves. This was a small but ultimately significant step toward developing trust and achieving a measure of intercultural understanding.

The civic action teams operated alone in areas in which the enemy could easily assemble forces adequate to annihilate them. Most villages included some members of the Viet Cong. General Peers organized the region surrounding the division base camp into five civic action sectors, and put one

of his five brigade base camp detachments in charge of each sector. Each brigade had an officer—the S-5—to coordinate and protect the civic action teams formed by the battalions in the brigade. In the fall of 1967 new policies mandated security practices for the teams. These included heavy armament, sandbags on the floors of trucks to nullify the effects of mines, a radio check-in system to keep track of all friendly elements in each civic action sector, on-call artillery support, and helicopter-borne reaction forces to respond to any enemy attack on a team. The security measures worked; the enemy attacked the teams with mines and ambushes, but no civic action soldiers were killed in 1967 and early 1968.[20]

Cultural Interaction

The three cultures in the highlands had mutually antagonistic goals and different languages. The Vietnamese and Montagnards shared ancient hostilities, and the Americans thought they knew what was best for everyone. Three vignettes will illustrate the inevitable complexities in their interactions.

Communication

Periodically each brigade S-5 would arrange a meeting of all the village chiefs in his sector. The division civic action officer arranged for a banquet, silent comedy films (Charlie Chaplin, The Three Stooges), games for the children, and transportation, so that most of the people in the hamlets would come to the meetings with the chiefs. The division civic action officer invited the Vietnamese district chief and other officials to come and give speeches—in keeping with the American commitment to build bonds of loyalty to the regime. The price for such a visitation was a helicopter to transport the district chief, trucks to bring a heavily armed Vietnamese force to assure his security in Montagnard country, assurance that all the village chiefs would be there, Vietnamese flags, public address equipment, and projectors for propaganda films. These provisions reflected the alienation between the GVN and the Montagnards.[21]

The district chief harangued and threatened the Montagnards. Fortunately, almost no one understood a thing that he said, and most of the meetings were spectacularly successful. The children had fun, and the adults got together and did some serious talking about things that mattered to them. These they communicated, in French, to the U.S. civic action officer. The Montagnards always brought several giant crocks of home brew, and the meetings closed on a festive note.[22]

The French language was the only means of direct communication among members of the three cultures. Many GVN officials spoke French, as did Montagnards who had served with the French Army during the Vietminh War. The few French-speaking Americans got on well with Montagnards, who were delighted to be able to converse seriously with someone who did not condescend to them.

Education

Education emerged as the Montagnards' top priority. They wanted their children to be able to participate fully in the Vietnamese culture. The 4th Division civic action officer therefore went to visit a Vietnamese district chief who needed help to build a school in a district that comprised three Vietnamese villages and 32 Montagnard villages. In a discussion through an interpreter, the civic action officer learned that there was already one school in the district, but no teachers. He asked, "Why, if it is hard to get teachers for one school, do you want to build another one?"

"The new one is three miles away."

"Could you recruit Montagnards as teachers?"

"No. The school is in a Vietnamese village."

"How will you get teachers?"

"Oh, teachers are not a problem. Once the province chief approves the school building, he will provide teachers."

"Has the province chief approved the new building?"

"Yes."

"As a school?"

"Uh, as a dispensary."

"Are there any schools in the district for Montagnards?"

"No."[23]

The civic action officer, with his egalitarian American cultural baggage, found the district chief's double talk and racism to be at variance with stated GVN policy, and morally reprehensible as well. From the district chief's

perspective, two schools for his three Vietnamese villages and none for the 32 savage Montagnard villages was just as it should be.

Shortly thereafter the civic action officer enlisted the aid of an influential American civilian known as the New Life Development Advisor, and called on the Pleiku Province Minister of Education to talk about schools for Montagnards. The two civilians, conversing through an interpreter, accomplished little. The civic action officer then addressed the Minister of Education in French. The minister got right to the point and said he could provide no teachers for Montagnards. The salaries he could offer were lower than a laborer's wage, and no Vietnamese teacher would live in a dirty, dangerous Montagnard village.[24] His words clearly delineated the differences between the Montagnard and the Vietnamese perspectives, and demonstrated the difficulty of the task U.S. soldiers faced in building support for the GVN.

The civic action staff, acting in accordance with American activist culture, conceived a plan for an American-run elementary education program to teach a few young Montagnards to read, write, and speak Vietnamese, to read and write their own language, and to do arithmetic. The faculty were to be U.S. soldiers, a French Catholic missionary who was in the process of transcribing a Montagnard dialect, and a young bilingual Montagnard aristocrat. Ultimately graduates of the program would enter the Vietnamese normal school or become unofficial village teachers.[25]

Livestock

The Americans asked the Vietnamese to clear the civilians from a 1,500 square mile area in the Ia Drang Valley between Pleiku and the Cambodian border so that they could bring all their firepower to bear on NVA units coming down the Ho Chi Minh trail. In April 1967 the GVN Army forcibly evacuated 8,000 Montagnards living in 48 villages, burned their houses, and concentrated them in Edap Enang, a huge resettlement camp southwest of Pleiku. The Montagnards had had rivers, gardens, and rice paddies, and pigs and chickens running free in the villages. All these resources had been left behind, and the Vietnamese had not made provisions for the Montagnards' subsistence.[26]

American engineer units cleared land for farming near Edap Enang, and an American civic action team built pig sties and raised a few enormous pigs to demonstrate the effectiveness of western techniques. The Montagnards, whose pigs were about the size of a dachshund, were not impressed. To them, penning pigs up and giving them food was backwards. The purpose of pigs was to feed people; pigs could get all they needed to eat if they were allowed to run free.[27] American and Montagnard farming customs were incompat-

ible, the crops planted on the newly cleared land would not produce food for months, and the GVN had no plan to feed Montagnards. The people were hungry, and about 2,000 Montagnards left Edap Enang and walked back to what was left of their villages.[28] GVN officials were humiliated and enraged, the Americans were annoyed at losing their free fire zone, and the Montagnards were in danger from the active combat in the region.

Security

Throughout this intercultural maneuvering security was rarely mentioned, but it was the key issue. Neither the GVN nor the U.S. forces made a commitment to provide security for the Montagnards living in Pleiku Province. Only two of the 79 villages had popular force platoons, and one had a squad. The 4th Division's combat forces were usually engaged with NVA units far from the base camp. The 23 civic action teams usually returned to the base camp at night, and the NVA and VC had free access to the villagers.

The Montagnards relied on neutrality to protect them, but in October 1967 a helicopter crashed near Plei Blong 3, a village beyond the civic action sectors. The villagers concealed an American NCO from the VC for several days. In recognition of their courage and kindness, a civic action team extended its sector to include the village. A few days later a VC unit told the people of Plei Blong 3 that if they went into their rice fields during the next few days, they would have their heads cut off. The villagers told their civic action team, who reported the matter to the 4th Division Headquarters. No one on the division staff was interested until that night, when NVA units launched rockets out of Plei Blong 3's rice fields onto Pleiku airport, the military hospital, and province headquarters.[29]

Also in October the VC began to send armed propaganda teams into villages at night. In November and December they kidnapped certain chiefs, terrorized them, and then sent them home. Some chiefs were frightened into submission; others took steps to protect their villages. The chiefs of eight villages 13 kilometers away from the 4th Division base camp were the first to act. They decided as soon as the VC harassment began to move ten kilometers closer and set up their houses in a compact settlement within sight of the U.S. base camp. They asked their civic action teams to get trucks to carry their houses to the new location.

Nine weeks later the VC abducted and terrorized four of the chiefs. When they were released, they asked for arms and fortifications to protect their settlement. General Peers wanted to provide them with weapons, but the GVN district and province chiefs feared the Montagnards more than the enemy,

and opposed arming them. No one opposed their fortifying their settlement, however. The G-5 arranged an issue of barbed wire, and the Montagnards built an effective obstacle. One could see the hand of French NCOs who had trained some of the older Montagnards during the Vietminh War.[30]

January 1968 was a nightmare for the GVN, the Montagnards, and the Americans. Early in the month a VC unit surrounded Plei Blong 3 and held a Peoples' Court. The VC recited the sins of various villagers and called on their frightened neighbors to condemn them. The VC cut pieces of flesh off the condemned, made the victims eat them, and later killed them.[31]

By 14 January, almost all of the Montagnards in Edap Enang had fled. The Vietnamese officials wanted to round them up by force, but the Americans were involved in a battle with an NVA division 100 miles to the north at Dak To, and could provide neither troops nor transport.[32] During December civic action teams began staying overnight in villages to give the civilians a sense of security. On 18 January a civic action team killed two members of a 25-man Viet Cong platoon entering Plei Pham Ngol and called in artillery and gunships on the rest. On 22 January another team arrested one Viet Cong and brought in four others who wanted to defect.[33] On 29 January the Viet Cong abducted the chiefs of four of the villages most committed to the Americans.[34] Montagnards warned U.S. troops about mines and ambushes on seven occasions, but still, during January, many American vehicles were blown up by mines.

As if the enemy action was not enough, the tensions in January brought on an explosion of the dark side of U.S. military culture. A U.S. general received a request from the GVN to authorize firing artillery into a village on the basis of a report that there were VC in the village. The civic action officer told the general the village was friendly and that the report was probably bogus, but the general authorized the firing anyway, "to keep faith with our allies." The shells killed the village chief, and permanently alienated the village. In another village a soldier in a tank tossed blocks of plastic explosive to a group of hungry Montagnards and indicated that it was food. Several people ate the toxic material, and one died. The 4th Division G-3, who had staff responsibility for the mission on which the tank platoon was working, insisted that the incident had not occured, but Army Criminal Investigation (CID) people dug into the matter. In a carefully crafted charade, the CID insisted on doing an autopsy on the dead man—a violation of Montagnard custom—to verify that he had died from eating the explosive. The Montagnards refused, the soldiers stonewalled, and the case was dropped.[35]

The terror tactics the VC had adopted were to prepare the way for a general offensive during the Tet holidays—a period usually honored by both

sides with a truce. On 30 January, the eve of Tet, civic action teams reported that several villages, among them Plei Blong 3, were depopulated. Only the very old and the very young remained, and no one would talk. That night a few Montagnards made their way to the 4th Division base camp to report that the people from their villages were being held under guard. They were to march on Pleiku at dawn with VC and NVA soldiers concealed among them. Other Montagnards reported the locations and dispositions of enemy combat units.[36]

Enough of this information made its way to the 4th Division command post to enable U.S. and Vietnamese forces to assemble the few American and GVN combat units in the vicinity of the base camp to defeat the VC and NVA Tet Offensive in the Central Highlands decisively. Most Vietnamese are prepared to accept atrocities as "the will of heaven" if the perpetrators win. Essentially, they have no other choice. But if the side that commits the outrages loses, its members are viewed as outlaws. Herein lies the signifigance for the VC of losing the Tet battles. Their party had gone all out, claimed political control, slaughtered popular figures, and abused populations whose support they would need. When they lost, their atrocities were seen as crimes and their political aspirations as presumptous. Members of the VC party and shadow government were discredited psychologically and rendered politically impotent. The North Vietnamese were perceived as invaders to be resisted. These perceptions obtained until the GVN alienated the Montagnards or until the NVA seized control of the Pleiku region in 1975.

The Montagnards used as shields in the battle managed to keep out of the line of fire and eventually got back to their villages. Within a month of the defeat of the Tet Offensive, twenty villages had asked for arms and assistance in fortifying themselves.[37] The Americans circumvented the objections of GVN officials by forming teams of armed Montagnards and U.S. soldiers in the fortified villages. On 4 March Montagnards told their civic action team about an NVA company hiding in a village. A battle of annihilation with U.S. Army units ensued that marked the transformation of the Pleiku region into a zone in which, for a time, no enemy regular or guerrilla units could survive.

Conclusion

From an immediate military perspective, the American civic action program in the Pleiku area was an example of successful cross-cultural interaction. No one had expected that Montagnards would switch from neutrality to participation in the war on the American side. The most important reason for this success was the respect the civic action personnel

showed toward the Montagnards and their culture. In a completely un-American way, civic action teams had yielded the initiative to the village chiefs, and then supported their efforts to achieve their chosen objectives. They did not make demands on the Montagnards or put pressure on them to behave in particular ways.

Other factors contributing to the success of civic action were attention to assuring the security of the civic action teams, use of the French language to make direct communication possible, and poor judgment by the NVA and VC in abandoning their initial supportive posture in favor of terrorism.

But, from a broader perspective, the American approach failed in three respects. First, the fundamental mission of the U.S. forces was to strengthen ties between the GVN and the people. Nothing the Americans could do had any effect on the centuries-old fear and hostility the ethnic Vietnamese felt toward the Montagnards. By treating Montagnards with respect and protecting them from abuse by the Vietnamese, the Americans only intensified the antipathy between them.

Second, the American national and military cultures did not place a high value on long-term intercultural relations. The civic action programs were short-term means to an end. Americans seek to solve problems and then move on, and that is exactly what they did in the Central Highlands. After the Tet Offensive the U.S. Army transferred the soldiers who were working on the Montagnard teacher training program, thereby terminating it. In 1970 the U.S. policy of Vietnamization (turning the war over to the South Vietnamese) pulled the 4th Infantry Division out of the Central Highlands, leaving the Montagnards at the mercy of the GVN. By 1972 the GVN had converted the former 4th Division base camp into a giant concentration camp for Montagnards.[38]

The third failure lay in the fact that the respect the Americans showed the Montagnards was, on at least one level, a sham. The American programs were based on good intentions, but they sought primarily to manipulate a vulnerable people to achieve short-term objectives. The price of success was the integrity of the individuals involved, the Army, and the United States—all on a very small scale, of course. But the integrity and credibility of an institution are derived from the cumulative history of its small honorable actions—and its dishonorable ones.

The story of civic action among the Montagnards illustrates how, in prosecuting the war in Vietnam, American senior political and military leaders acted from their own cultural perspective. They did not recognize the necessity of learning about the peoples they sought to manipulate, and ignored feedback from troops who were in contact with the indigenous cultures. As a consequence they were groping in cultural obscurity, and were unable to

develop in South Vietnam long-term programs that would achieve the fundamental objective of U.S. policy—developing a self-sustaining buffer state with the trust and confidence to contain an expansionist North Vietnam.

Notes

1. Richard A. Hunt, *Pacification: The American Struggle for Vietnam's Hearts and Minds* (Boulder, CO: Univ. of Colorado Press, 1995); Eric M. Bergerud, *The Dynamics of Defeat: The Vietnam War in Hau Nghia Province* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991).
2. Michael E. Peterson, *The Combined Action Platoons: The U.S. Marines' Other War in Vietnam* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1989); William R. Corson, *The Betrayal* (New York: Ace Books, 1968).
3. Neil Sheehan, *A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam* (New York: Random House, 1988) 55, 76–78, 175–183.
4. Corson, *Combined Action Platoons,* 116–117.
5. Gerald C. Hickey, *Sons of the Mountains: Ethnohistory of the Vietnamese Central Highlands to 1954* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1982) 76–77, 84–93.
6. Hickey, *Sons of the Mountains*, 7–19, map 3.
7. Hickey, *Sons of the Mountains,* xvi.
8. Gerald C. Hickey, *Free in the Forest: Ethnohistory of the Vietnamese Central Highlands, 1954–1976* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1982) 10, 201–202.
9. Hickey, *Sons of the Mountains*, 445.
10. Hickey, *Free in the Forest*, 136, 169; Hickey, *Sons of the Mountains*, 3.
11. Richard A. Gabriel and Paul L. Savage, *Crisis in Command: Mismanagement in the Army* (New York: Hill & Wang, 1978) 29ff, 51ff; James Kitfield, *Prodigal Soldiers* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995) 67–74; U.S. Department of the Army, *Study on_Military Professionalism* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1970) iii–iv; Douglas Kinnard, *The War Managers* (New York: Da Capo Press, 1991) 116.
12. Sheehan, *A Bright Shining Lie*, 169–174.
13. Ibid., 86ff.
14. U.S. Department of the Army, Headquarters 4th Infantry Division, Letter, AVDDH-GC, Subject: Operational Report: Lessons Learned (RCS CSFOR-65) for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967 (U), 17. Hereafter ORLL 30 Apr. 1967.
15. General Peers subsequently commanded II Field Force, Vietnam, and investigated the My Lai Massacre. His letter to General Westmoreland criticizing the behavior of officers provoked the Army War College Study of Military Professionalism, the first step in the military renaissance of 1970–1990.
16. U.S. Department of the Army, Headquarters 4th Infantry Division, OPPLAN 10-61, Defense of TAOR and Dragon Mountain, 30 April 1967; U.S. Department of the

Army, Headquarters 4th Infantry Division, Letter, AVDDH-GC, Subject: Operational Report: Lessons Learned (RCS CSFOR-65) for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967 (U), 20.

17. Michael E. Peterson, *The Combined Action Platoons* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1989) 32–33.

18. See, for example, Corson, *The Betrayal*, 196–198; Robert Flynn, *A Personal War in Vietnam* (College Station, TX: Texas A & M University Press), 13, for attitudes among Marines toward civic action duty.

19. U.S. Army staff functions are organized as follows (G staffs are at division and higher; S staffs are at brigade and battalion): G-1/S-1: Personnel and administration; G-2/S-2: Intelligence, terrain, weather; G-3/S-3: Plans, operations, and training; G-4/S-4: Logistics, maintenance, supply, evacuation; G-5/S-5: Military government, civic action, psychological operations.

20. U.S. Department of the Army, Headquarters 4th Infantry Division, OPORD 40-67, Defense of TAOR and Camp Enari, 31 October 1967.

21. U.S. Department of the Army, Headquarters 4th Infantry Division, Letter, AVDDH-GC, Subject: Operational Report: Lessons Learned (RCS CSFOR-65) for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967 (U), 23. Hereafter ORLL 31 Oct 1967.

22. U.S. Department of the Army, Headquarters 4th Infantry Division, Letter, AVDDH-GC, Subject: Operational Report: Lessons Learned (RCS CSFOR-65) for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968 (U), 18. Hereafter ORLL 31 January 1968. Letters from the Assistant G-5 (Civic Action) of the 4th Infantry Division to his wife dated 26 October 1967 and 14 December 1967 (in possession of the author). Hereafter G-5 letter, with date.

23. G-5 letter, 16 October 1967.

24. G-5 Letter, 20 October 1967.

25. ORLL 31 Oct. 1967, 22; G-5 letters, 4 and 19 January 1968.

26. ORLL 30 Apr. 1967, 18; Hickey, *Free in the Forest*, 165–166.

27. G-5 letters, 6 and 16 November 1967.

28. ORLL 31 Jan. 1968, 19; G-5 letter, 16 October 1967.

29. ORLL 31 Oct. 1967, 21; G-5 letter, 27 October 1967.

30. ORLL 31 Jan. 1968, 20; G-5 letter, 20 November 1967.

31. ORLL 31 Jan. 1968, 22, 23; G-5 letter, 19 January 1968.

32. G-5 letter, 29 January 1968.

33. G-5 letter, 7 January 1968.

34. U.S. Department of the Army, Headquarters 4th Infantry Division, Letter, AVDDH-GC, Subject: Operational Report: Lessons Learned (RCS CSFOR-65) for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968 (U), 25. Hereafter ORLL 30 April 1968.

35. G-5 letter, 7 January 1968.

36. ORLL 31 Jan. 1968, 23; G-5 letters, 30, 31 January 1968.

37. ORLL 30 Apr. 1968, 25, 71; ORLL 31 January 1968, 23.

38. Gerald Cannon Hickey, "The Lost Montagnards," *New York Times,* 16 August 1973, 35.